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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH

BRIEF

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.

CaseNo:970697-CA
Priority:

SERVANDO PARRA,
Defendant-Appellant

all parties listed on cover

SUBJECT MATTER AND APPELLATE JURISDICTION
This is an appeal in a criminal proceedings from a Judgment and Order and
conviction entered by the Second Judicial District Court in and for Davis County,
State of Utah. The Appellant, Servando Parra, was sentenced to prison on August
20, 1997, by Judge Rodney Page. Statutory authority exists for this Appeal based
upon the Rule 3(a) and 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. No
motions were filed after entry of judgment of conviction. The Defendant is in the
custody of the Utah State Prison pending this appeal and the trial court has granted
a Motion for certificate of Probable Cause but found the Defendant was a flight
risk and denied release on appeal. There are no related or prior appeals.

1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW THE STANDARD
OF APPELLATE REVIEW WITH SUPPORTING AUTHORITY
AND CITATIONS

1. SHOULD LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS BE REQUIRED TO
OBTAIN A SEARCH WARRANT UNDER THE FOURTH AND
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
BEFORE REMOVING A VEHICLE FROM A PRIVATE RESIDENCE AND
TAKING THE VEHICLE TO ANOTHER COUNTY AND SEARCHING THE
VEHICLE?
Standard of review: In Ornelas v. United States, 96 C.D.O.S 3744, No. 955257 (U.S. 1996), the Court held that questions of reasonable suspicion and
probable cause to make a warrant less search should be reviewed de novo. In
considering a motion to suppress, the Court reviews a trial court's underlying
factual findings under a "clearly erroneous" standard. State v. Smith, 781 P.2d at
881; However, the Court reviews the trial court's ultimate legal conclusions
flowing from these factual findings under a "correctness" standard. State v.
Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 215 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Lopez, 831 P.2d 1040
(Utah App. 1992). The trial court specifically found that exigent circumstances
existed in this case. The determination of whether exigent circumstances existed
is a question of fact, which should not be disturbed on appeal unless clearly
erroneous. State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255 (Utah 1987).
Citation to Record: The Appellant's filed a Motion to Suppress, see Record
2

39 of the Record. The Trial Judge announced the decision on the Motion to
Suppress on page 396 of the record.

2. DID THE COURT ERR IN DENYING THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS
THE LINE UP IDENTIFICATION CONDUCTED AT THE SCENE OF THE
DEFENDANT?
Standard of review: The Constitutionality of an identification procedure is a
mixed question of law and fact. State v. Mincy, 838 P.2d 648 (Utah App. 1992)
Citation to Record: The Appellant's filed a Motion to Suppress, see page 40
of the Record. The Court announced the decision on the Motion to Suppress on
page 396 of the record.

3. DID THE COURT ERR IN REFUSING TO GIVE THE LESSER
INCLUDED CRIMINAL OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS THAT WERE
REQUESTED BY THE DEFENDANT?
Standard of Review: The issue of Jury Instructions and determining the
propriety of a Jury Instruction present a question of law, using the correction of
error standard with no particular deference to Trial Court. State v. Gonzalez, 822
P.2d 1214 (Utah 1991) and State v. Brooks, 186 Utah Adv. Rep. 30 (Utah Ct. App.
1992).
Citation to Record: The Appellants requested Jury Instructions are set forth
3

in the second , at page 142 to 171. Discussion on the record and ruling as to
Instructions is found at pages 147 to 151.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES,
AND REGULATIONS WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS
DETERMINATIVE OF THE APPEAL
Utah Code Ann. 41-6-116.10. Abandoned vehicles - Removal by peace officer Report - Procedure if not reclaimed.
(1) A person may not abandon a vehicle upon any highway.
(2) A person may not abandon a vehicle upon any public or private property
without the express or implied consent of the owner or person in lawful possession
or control of the property.
(3) (a) A peace officer who has reasonable grounds to believe that a vehicle has
been abandoned may remove the vehicle or cause it to be removed, at the expense
of the owner, to the nearest state impound yard or if none, to a garage or other
place of safety.
(b) The peace officer shall immediately send a written report of the removal to the
Motor Vehicle Division. The report shall include a description of the vehicle, the
date, time and place of removal, the grounds for removal, and the name of the
garage or place where the vehicle is stored.
(c) Upon receipt of a report, the Motor Vehicle Division shall attempt to notify the
registered owner of the vehicle or any lien holder giving the grounds for removal
and the name of the garage or place where the vehicle is stored.
(d) If the vehicle is not registered in this state, the Motor Vehicle Division shall
make a reasonable effort to notify the registered owner or any lien holder of the
removal and the name of the garage or place where the vehicle is stored.
(e) The Motor Vehicle Division shall forward a copy of the notice to the owner or
person in charge of the garage or place where the vehicle is stored.
(4) For the purposes of this section, a vehicle is presumed to be abandoned if it is
left unattended:
(a) on a highway for a period in excess of 24 hours; or
(b) on any public or private property for a period in excess of seven days without
4

express or implied consent of the owner or person in lawful possession or control
of the property.
(5) If the motor number, manufacturer's number or identification mark of the
abandoned vehicle has been defaced, altered or obliterated, the vehicle may not be
released or sold until the original motor number, manufacturer's number or
identification mark has been replaced, or until a new number assigned by the
Motor Vehicle Division has been stamped on the vehicle.
(6) If the abandoned vehicle is not reclaimed by the registered owner or any lien
holder within 30 days after actual notice or reasonable attempt to give notice to the
registered owner or any lien holder, the provisions of Sections 41-la-1009 and
41-la-l 102 shall apply, and the abandoned vehicle may be sold as provided in
Section 41-la-1301.
Utah Code Ann 41-6-44.30. Seizure and impoundment of vehicles by peace
officers - Impound requirements - Removal of vehicle by owner.
(1) (a) If a peace officer arrests or cites the operator of a vehicle for violating
Section 41-6-44 or 41-6-44.10, or a local ordinance similar to Section 41-6-44
which complies with Subsection 41-6-43(1), the officer shall seize and impound
the vehicle, except as provided under Subsection (2).
(b) A vehicle seized and impounded under this section shall be moved by a peace
officer or by a tow truck that meets the standards established:
(i) by the department under Subsection 41-6-102(4)(b);
(ii) under Title 41, Chapter 6, Article 18, Tow Truck and Impound Regulation Act;
and
(iii) the Public Service Commission under Section 54-6-42.5.
(2) If a registered owner of the vehicle, other than the operator, is present at the
time of arrest, the officer may release the vehicle to that registered owner, but only
if the registered owner:
(a) requests to remove the vehicle from the scene;
(b) presents to the officer a valid operators license and sufficient identification to
prove ownership of the vehicle;
(c) complies with all restrictions of his operator's license; and
(d) would not, in the judgment of the officer, be in violation of Section 41-6-44 or
41-6-44.10, or a local ordinance similar to Section 41-6-44 which complies with
Subsection 41-6-43(1), if permitted to operate the vehicle, and if the vehicle itself
is legally operable.
5

(3) (a) The peace officer or agency by whom the officer is employed shall, within
24 hours after the seizure, notify the Motor Vehicle Division of the seizure and
impoundment.
(b) The notice shall state:
(i) the operator's name;
(ii) a description of the vehicle;
(iii) its identification number, if any;
(iv) its license number;
(v) the date, time, and place of impoundment;
(vi) the reason for impoundment; and
(vii) the name of the garage or place where the vehicle is stored.
(4) Upon receipt of notice, the Motor Vehicle Division shall give notice to the
registered owner of the vehicle in the manner prescribed by Section 41-la-114.
The notice shall:
(a) state the date, time, and place of impoundment, the name of the person
operating the vehicle at the time of seizure, if applicable, the reason for seizure
and impoundment, and the name of the garage or place where the vehicle is stored;
(b) state that the registered owner is responsible for payment of towing, impound,
and storage fees charged against the vehicle; and
(c) inform the registered owner of the vehicle of the conditions under Subsection
(5) that must be satisfied before the vehicle is released.
(5) (a) The impounded vehicle shall be released after the registered owner or the
owner's agent:
(i) makes a claim in person for release of the vehicle at any office of the State Tax
Commission;
(ii) pays an administrative impound fee of $25;
(iii) presents identification sufficient to prove ownership of the impounded
vehicle; and
(iv) pays all towing and storage fees to the impound lot where the vehicle is
stored.
(b) All impound fees assessed under this subsection are dedicated credits to the
Motor Vehicle Division.

6

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a criminal prosecution based upon a felony information charging the
Defendant with Aggravated Assault (Three Counts), Carrying a Concealed
Weapon, a Second Degree Felony; and Criminal Mischief, a Third Degree Felony.
(Information page 15 and attached in Appendix) The Information was filed in the
Second Judicial District Court, Farmington, Utah, and the case assigned to the
Honorable Judge Rodney S. Page.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
The Appellant's filed a Pretrial Motion to Suppress the evidence seized
from the vehicle without a warrant (R. 39) and also a Motion to Suppress the
pretrial identification process. (R. 42) After the information was bound over to the
District Court for trial. An Evidentiary Hearing was held in May 22, 1997. After
the Hearing, the Court held that there was never a valid inventory conducted of the
vehicle but found that there existed exigent circumstances for seizing the vehicle
and transporting it from the Rose Park area of Salt Lake County to the Davis
County Sheriffs shops where the vehicle was searched. The Court also denied the
Pretrial Motion to suppress the line up identification.
7

DISPOSITION IN COURT BELOW
At a Jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of all charges of the
Information. Mr Parra has been sentenced by the Court to the Utah State Prison
on all counts and is presently incarcerated pending this appeal.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
EVIDENCE INTRODUCED AT MOTION TO SUPPRESS
1. A Motion to Suppress hearing was held in this case on May 22, 1997.
The State called Lynn Hooper, a police officer from Bountiful City Police
Department, who received a dispatch concerning a possible drive by shooting an
attempt to locate for two vehicles. (R. 252 to 407)
2. The attempt to locate was for a maroon Chevrolet and a tan Buick Regal
and the ATL came in at approximately 2:45 a.m. The officer indicated that he
observed a Buick Riegle with a Hispanic driver and three to four occupants from
his position in the area of 4600 South and Woods Cross, Davis County, Utah. (R.
261) He began following the vehicle and noted that the vehicle was traveling 85
to 95 miles per hour and he then followed the vehicle without activating his
emergency lights from Davis County across the line from Davis County to Salt
Lake County down from 1-15 to 900 West where the vehicle exited.
8

3. He followed the vehicle off the exit to a residence at 600 North and 1000
West in the Rose Park area of Salt Lake City. (R. 263) He acknowledged that
during that period of time, he did not turn on his emergency lights. (R. 264)
4. When the vehicle stopped, the officer treated the stop as a felony stop
and ordered the driver and other persons to stop and he pulled out his firearm. He
then waited until other officers from Davis County Sheriffs Department arrived.
(R. 266) He indicated that he never received any information as far as a stolen
vehicle while following the Monticarlo from Davis County to Rose Park, Utah. (R.
284)
5. The officer stated that he believed that felony stop procedures were
involved because there was a report of a shooting and that also the vehicle had
been speeding. (R. 268) On cross examination, the officer admitted that the
Monticarlo that he was following was not tan but was a darker color like blue. (R.
269) The officer testified that he did not arrest the persons for any type of
speeding offence. (R. 281)
7. The next witness was James Phillips, a West Bountiful City Police
officer, who was involved in the pursuit and responded to Rose Park, Utah. (R.
290) He testified that as the people came out of the vehicle they were brought
back to where he was located and patted down for weapons. (R.291) He testified
9

that when patting down the Defendant, Servando Parra, he recovered some
ammunition when he felt into the left pocket. He brought out three rounds of 357
ammunition. (R. 294)
8. After a series of officers testified concerning incidents in Rose Park, the
State called as a witness, Tokelau lea Leiki, who testified that on January 19,
1997, he was with two friends in Salt Lake City when he said that they were
followed by two vehicles from a 7-11 in Salt Lake City. (R. 343) He testified that
a car followed them and pulled up to them and was flipping them gang signs while
the vehicles were traveling north bound on the Interstate through Davis County,
Utah. (R. 245)
9. The witness indicated that anther car pulled up and that he heard shots
fired at the vehicle. (R. 249) The vehicle traveled a short ways north and stopped
near a police officer and reported the shooting to the vehicle. No one was hurt or
injured during the shooting and a report was them made concerning the two
vehicles. (R. 352)
10. Robert Hunt was called and he testified that he was employed at the
Deputy County Sheriffs Department and he was contacted concerning a possible
drive by shooting as the "on-call" detective for the crime lab service. (R. 368)
11. Deputy Hunt testified that he received a telephone call and responded to
10

an area in Salt Lake County and when he arrived, the two suspect vehicles were
already under arrest. (R. 367) He contacted a Sergeant Mike King, with the Utah
Highway Patrol, and he indicated that the sergeant asked him "that I conduct an
inventory and processing on the two vehicles they had taken into impound
incident to the arrest of the two suspects". He indicated that he was provided a
Utah Highway Inventory Form which was introduced as a Exhibit at the hearing.
(R. 369)
12. After Deputy Hunt had been told that the vehicle had been struck by a
small arms on the Interstate, he indicated that he and Sergeant King made the
decision to transport the vehicle from Salt Lake County to the Farmington City
shops. (R. 372) He indicated that the vehicle was transported to the shops where
he photographed the vehicle took an "inventory" and processed the vehicle for
evidence, including latent fingerprints. (R. 273) He indicated that he found a
firearm under the front seat of the vehicle which was a 357 magnum revolver. (R.
375)
13. On cross-examination, he admitted that the towing company that towed
the vehicle did not perform an inventory before the vehicle was towed away from
the scene and transported across the county line from Salt Lake County to Davis
County. (R. 377) He testified that the Salt Lake City Police were not called to
11

the location in Rose Park and did not perform an inventory. (R. 377)
14. The Defendant, Servando Parra, took the stand and testified that he was
in a Monticarlo vehicle that was stopped at his residence in Rose Park, Utah. He
indicated that he did not ask anyone to remove the Monticarlo from the residence
and out of the driveway and he never gave his consent to seize or search the
vehicle without a Search Warrant. (R. 384)

TESTIMONY AT TRIAL
15. At the trial, the first witness was Tokelau lea Leiki, who again testified
that a person later identified as Servando Parra's younger brother confronted him
in a 7-11 in Rose Park and followed the vehicle in which he was riding north on I15. (R. 414)
16. He indicated that two cars came up behind his vehicle and that the
Defendant, Servando Parra was the driver of one of the vehicles driving down the
freeway. Shots were fired before the vehicle in which he was riding started to
speed and stopped to talk to a police officer pulled over beside the Interstate. (R.
420)
17. He indicated that after he was stopped, he was transported back to Salt
Lake City where he was shown a line-up where the Defendant and the other
12

persons were placed in front of his vehicle and he was asked to identify the people
in the line-up. (R. 422)
18. In cross examination, he denied that anyone in his vehicle had a gun.
(R. 429)
19. After a series of police officers testified concerning the apprehension
and the arrest of the Defendant and the search of the vehicle, the next witness
material to the substantiative of the charge, was called by the Defendant. Raul
Sanchez testified through an interpreter concerning the events that transpired from
his prospective as a passenger in the vehicle driven by the Defendant, Servando
Parra. (R. 526)
20. He testified that he had been in jail since he was arrested and he had
plead guilty to firing the firearm at the vehicle in January, 1996, for which the
Defendant was charged. (R. 526)
21. He testified that he was located next to the driver, Servando Parra, and
that he picked up the gun from underneath the seat. (R. 527)
22. The witness, Raul Sanchez, testified that Servando Parra did not tell
him to shoot the gun at anyone and that he aimed and fired at the floor of the
vehicle below the wheels of the car because he believed that the other passengers
had put out guns and where going to shoot at his vehicle. (R. 527)
13

23. Raul Sanchez testified that he had gone to a fight that evening with
Servando Parra. (R. 630)
24. The witness testified that the reason his vehicle followed the other
vehicle is that he and Mr. Parra were following Mr. Parra's younger brother and
were going to pick up the kids and bring the other passengers in the other vehicle
back home and that they were not chasing or pursuing the vehicle into which the
shots were later fired. (R. 532)
25. After the case proceeded, the Defendant made a Motion to dismiss the
count Carrying A Concealed Weapon based upon insufficient evidence. (R. 539)
26. Counsel for the Defendant objected to the failure to include to the
charges to the Jury, the proposed jury instructions as to Simple Assault, as a lesser
included offence of the charge of Aggravated Assault. (R. 557-560)
27. The Court denied the request finding that the evidence does not
rationally support a conviction for the lessor included offence. (R. 560)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1. Mr. Parra submits that the police here acted in disregard of the United
States and Utah Constitutions concerning provisions related to search and seizure.
The officers had time and opportunity to obtain a Search Warrant and instead the
14

vehicle was seized and towed from the Rose Park area of Salt Lake County, State
of Utah, into Davis County, State of Utah. No exigent circumstances or probable
cause existed to private property and that the Court erred in finding exigent
circumstances to justify the seizure and the subsequent search.
2. Mr. Parra and the other persons who were required to stand in an
impromptu line-up and the Court should have suppressed the identification
process.
3. The Defendant's involvement in the offense was as a driver and it is
undisputed that he never fired the weapon. In light of the testimony and other
factors, the Court should have included the lessor included offenses as specifically
requested by the Defendant.

POINT I
SHOULD LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS BE REQUIRED TO OBTAIN
A SEARCH WARRANT UNDER THE FOURTH AND FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND THE
UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION BEFORE REMOVING A VEHICLE
FROM A PRIVATE RESIDENCE AND TAKING THE VEHICLE TO
ANOTHER COUNTY AND SEARCHING THE VEHICLE?
The Trial Judge rejected the main justification of a inventory search which
was given by the State for removing the vehicle from the Rose Park area of Salt

15

Lake City, Utah to the Davis County shops for a search. However, the Court went
on to find that exigent circumstances justified the seizure and the removal of the
vehicle to search of the vehicle in another county.
The Court found that the inventory search was not based upon standardized
procedures. For an inventory search of a lawfully impounded vehicle to be
reasonable, the officer conducting the search must follow standardized procedures
and the "Government must prove compliance with those procedures. State v.
Montya, 314 Utah Adv. Rep. 54 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). In Colorado v. Bertine,
479 U.S. 367 (1987), the Supreme Court stated that a police officer may impound
car and conduct inventory search "so long as [officer's] discretion is exercised
according to standard criteria and on the basis of something other than suspicion
of evidence of criminal activity".
The ruling as to an improper inventory search should have resulted in
suppression. The ruse of the inventory search showed the bad faith and
unreasonableness of law enforcement procedures in relation to the vehicle. When
impoundment of a vehicle is justified, the ensuing search must be "conducted for
inventory purposes, in a legal manner, and not merely as a fishing expedition for
evidence/" State v. Sterger, 808 P.2d 125 (Utah 1989). Here, the entire incident
was a fishing expedition under the guise of an impoundment.
16

Further, the Defendant respectfully submits the Court erred in finding
exigent circumstances to seize the vehicle without a Warrant. In State v.
Christensen, 676 P.2d 408 (Utah 1984), the Court stated that "[warrantless
searches and seizures are per se unreasonable unless exigent circumstances require
action before a warrant can be obtained." 676 P.2d at 411. Justice Stewart writing
for the court in Christens en determined that "[warrantless searches and seizures
are per se unreasonable unless exigent circumstances require action before a
warrant can be obtained.... [T]he police must have probable cause to believe that
the automobile contains either contraband or evidence of a crime and that they
may be lost if not immediately seized." The exigency of immediate circumstances
was also a operative factor in State v. Romero, 660 P.2d 715 (Utah 1983) and in
State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48 (Utah 1981).
The need for an immediate search must be apparent to the police and must
be so strong as to outweigh the important protection of individual rights provided
by the warrant requirement. State v. Beavers, 859 P.2d 9 (Utah App. 1993).
Exigent circumstance doctrine applies only when the inevitable delay incident to
obtaining a warrant must give way to an urgent need for immediate action. United
State v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827 (11th Cir. 1984). The Court has held that
exigent circumstances exist where officers have reason to believe evidence may be
17

destroyed before they can obtain a warrant and the court must evaluate the
circumstances as they would have appeared to prudent, cautious and trained
officers. United States v. Cuaron, 700 F.2d 582 (10th Cir. 1983).
In State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1268-69 (Utah 1987), while not imposing a
requirement of obtaining a telephonic warrant, the Court encourages the use of
telephonic warrants. In that decision, the Court noted that a warrantless search
could require suppression and the availability of a telephonic warrant is a
substantial factor in determining existence of exigent circumstances.
All of the factors involved in this seizure require suppression. The vehicle
had been stopped and did not match the color or type of vehicle dispatched. The
Defendants arrested in Salt Lake County and in the jurisdiction of the Salt Lake
City Police. Nothing significant in plain view was observed in the vehicles. The
Monte Carlo owned by Mr. Parra was towed and removed across county lines to
Davis County, Utah, even though the Salt Lake City Police Department Officer
was called to the scene. There was time to obtain a search warrant, either before
moving the vehicle or before commencing the search at the shop where the vehicle
had been removed from the jurisdiction of another police agency.
The Search Warrant should have been obtained or the vehicle left at the
residence. When the Monte Carlo arrived at the residence of the Defendant, there
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was no basis to impound the lawfully licensed vehicle which was parked on
private property. See Utah Code Annotated Section 41-6-44.30 (1953), (set forth
on page 5 of this brief)
The lower court relied on exception to the warrant known as the automobile
exception. This exception was articulated in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132 (1925). The Carroll Court concluded that where it is not practicable to secure
a warrant when the vehicle may be quickly moved out of the jurisdiction (exigent
circumstances) and when the officer has probable cause to believe that the vehicle
is involved in criminal activity, no Search Warrant is required. Id. at 151-52.
These two requirements — exigent circumstances and probable cause are the
frame-work for determining when a warrant would be required to search an
automobile.
Only in exigent circumstances will the judgement of the police as to
probable cause serve as a sufficient authorization for a search under Carroll That
decision holds a search warrant unnecessary where there is probable cause to
search an automobile stopped on the highway; the car is movable, the occupants
are alerted, and the car's contents may never be found again if a warrant must be
obtained. None of those factors is present in this search of the vehicle parked in
the driveway of Defendant's residence and in the jurisdiction of the Salt Lake City
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Police Department.
The search is similar to the search in Coolidge v New Hampshire, 403
U.S. 443 (1971). There a search of an automobile seized in defendant's driveway
was held not to come within the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.
The police in Coolidge had conducted an investigation over several weeks that
linked the defendant to a murder. When enough evidence had been accumulated to
justify the arrest of the defendant, the state Attorney General, acting as a justice of
the peace, issued an arrest warrant and search warrants for defendant's house and
cars. The defendant was arrested at his house. His wife was told that she could not
use the cars because they had been impounded. Subsequently, the cars were towed
to the police station, where they were later searched.
The court in Coolidge held that the evidence found in one of the automobiles
was improperly admitted at defendant's trial. The warrants that were issued by the
state attorney general were invalid because he was not a neutral and detached
magistrate. Absent a valid warrant, there were no exigent circumstances justifying
the search of the car. The court stated: "since the police knew of the presence of
the automobile and planned all along to seize it, there was no 'exigent
circumstance' to justify their failure to obtain a warrant." In rejecting the "plain
view" argument that the car could be seized and searched because it was an
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instrumentality of the crime and plainly visible at defendant's house, the court
stated:
11

determining factors are advance police knowledge of the existence and location
of the evidence, police intention to seize it, and the ample opportunity for
obtaining a warrant." Coolidge, supra, 482
In Chambers v Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), the Court wrote:
"Neither Carroll, supra, nor other cases in this Court require or suggest that in
every conceivable circumstance the search of an auto even with probable cause
may be made without the extra protection for privacy that a warrant affords. But
the circumstances that furnish probable cause to search a particular auto for
particular articles are most often unforeseeable; moreover, the opportunity to
search is fleeting since a car is readily movable. Where this is true, as in Carroll
and the case before us now, if an effective search is to be made at any time, either
the search must be made immediately without a warrant or the car itself must be
seized and held without a warrant for whatever period is necessary to obtain a
warrant for the search, (emphasis added)
The Courts have consistently ruled probable cause if it exists alone is never
enough to search for and seize contraband without a warrant. If it were, the
protection of the Fourth Amendment would be rendered a nullity and probable
cause alone would make all warrantless searches per se reasonable. Absent
exigent circumstances, a warrantless entry to search for weapons or contraband is
unconstitutional, even when a felony has been committed and there is probable
cause to believe that incriminating evidence will be found within. Payton v. New
York 445 U.S. 573 (U.S. 1980).
The Utah Supreme Court has determined that Utah Constitutional law
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requires "both probable cause and exigent circumstance [be] present at the time of
a search" in order to properly search a vehicle without a warrant. State v. Larocco,
19A P.2d 460, 470 (Utah 1990). The Utah Supreme Court has disagreed with
federal decisions holding no showing of exigent circumstances is necessary to
search a vehicle without a warrant. Reasoning the federal decisions "cannot be
squared with the oft-stated principle that warrants-when-practicable is the best
policy," in State v. Larocco, the Utah Supreme Court held Article I, Section 14 of
the Utah Constitution requires "both probable cause and exigent circumstances
[be] present at the time of the search." 794 P.2d 460, 470 (Utah 1990); accord
State v. Sims, 808 P.2d 141 (Utah App. 1991).
In State v. Larocco, the Utah Supreme Court noted that under the Fourth
Amendment, warrantless automobile searches are constitutionally permissible only
where probable cause and exigent circumstances exist. Id. at 470. The court
described exigent circumstances as "namely, to protect the safety of police or the
public or to prevent the destruction of evidence." Id In State v. Christensen, 676
P.2d 408, 411 (Utah 1984) the court stating that exigent circumstances exist where
officers reasonably believe that evidence may be lost if not "immediately seized".
Thus, "the need for an immediate search must be apparent to the police, and so
strong as to outweigh the important protection of individual rights provided by the
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warrant requirement." State v. Beavers, 859 P.2d 9, 18 (Utah App. 1993).
Here there was no probable cause or plain view of any gun and the
defendants had all been taken to jail. Any exigency had terminated and the law
enforcement officers could and should have obtained legal process from the court
where the vehicle was located instead of towing the vehicle. Instead, law
enforcement transported down the witnesses and conducted a show up and had
time to obtain a warrant. The Appellant submits that the Court erred in denying
the Motion to Suppress and the Order denying the Motion to Suppress should be
reversed and remanded to the lower court.

POINT II
DID THE COURT ERR IN DENYING THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE
LINE UP IDENTIFICATION CONDUCTED AT THE SCENE OF THE
DEFENDANT
The Defendant contends that the Trial Court erred in denying his Motion To
Suppress the victim's pretrial identification. The manner and method of
identification was unreliable and the Defendant submits that it violates his right to
Due Process under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
Article One, Section Seven of the Utah Constitution. Under the Due Process
analysis, the ultimate question to be determined is whether the State has proven
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under the totality of the circumstances, the identification was reliable. State v.
Mincy, 838 P. 2d 648 (Utah App. 1992) and State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah
1991)
In Ramirez, the Utah Supreme Court outlined both the procedure to be
followed and the factors to be considered by trial courts in determining the
reliability of eyewitness testimony under the Due Process Clause of the Utah
Constitution. In discussing the proper procedure, the Ramirez court provided a
broad overview of the law surrounding the admission of eyewitness
identifications, including a clear discussion of the separate and distinct roles of the
prosecutor, the judge, and the jury. According to Ramirez, the prosecutor carries
the initial burden of demonstrating the admissibility of eyewitness testimony by
laying the foundation upon which the trial court can make any necessary
preliminary factual findings and reach any necessary legal conclusions. The
judge, "as arbiter of the constitutional admissibility of an identification," is
required to scrutinize proffered evidence for constitutional defects. The Trial
Court presented with the issue of the admissibility of an eyewitness identification
must preliminarily determine whether the identification is sufficiently reliable that
its admission and consideration by the jury will not deny the defendant due
process.
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In determining whether an identification is reliable, the court must consider
"all the circumstances" surrounding the identification and appraise those
circumstances in light of five factors. Based on federal case law, see Manson v.
Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, (1972), and the
Utah Supreme Court's decision in State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986). In
Ramirez the court established a separate, more in-depth due process analysis of the
reliability of eyewitness identifications under the Utah Constitution. In
determining reliability, a court must consider these pertinent factors:
(1) [T]he opportunity of the witness to view the actor during the
event; (2) the witness's degree of attention to the actor at the time of
the event; (3) the witness's capacity to observe the event, including
his or her physical and mental acuity; (4) whether the witness's
identification was made spontaneously and remained consistent
thereafter, or whether it was the product of suggestion; and (5) the
nature of the event being observed and the likelihood that the witness
would perceive, remember and relate it correctly. The Court noted that this
last area includes such factors as whether the event was an ordinary one in
the mind of the observer during the time it was observed, and whether the
race of the actor was the same as the observer's. See 817 P.2d at 778-84.
In this case, the arresting officers decided to conduct a line up of the
Defendant and other persons arrested at the scene. The witness had only a brief
time to view the person driving down the highway at night in another car. The
alleged victim was transported down to the place the Defendant and others were
located. There the persons were required to stand in an impromptu lineup while
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the alleged victim viewed them from a distance using the illumination of the patrol
vehicle.
After the Defendant was arrested, the Defendant was arranged with the three
co-defendants in a lineup before at least two of the alleged victims. At that time
the alleged victims were inside police cars and were only shown the persons who
had been arrested and in custody. The Defendant was denied of his right to have
an attorney present by the lineup. The procedure was unfair and influenced the
identification of the Defendant, Servando Parra. The Defendant requests that the
Court schedule a Hearing concerning the Motion to Suppress the Identification of
the alleged victims through the lineup based on the Pretrial lineup.

POINT III
THE COURT SHOULD HAVE GIVEN THE INSTRUCTION AS TO
LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES REQUESTED BY THE DEFENDANT
The Defendant requested that the Court give to the jury instructions of
offenses which were included in the offenses charged in the information of
Assault and Carrying A Loaded Firearm, a Class B Misdemeanor. (See Defendants
requested instruction page and Record page 144, 148, 149, 163, 164, 165, 166 and
167) The Court rejected those Instructions which resulted in a verdict of guilty to
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the felony offenses without any consideration by the jury of the lesser included
offenses.
The trial court must give a lesser included offense instruction if "the
evidence is ambiguous and susceptible to alternative explanations... [and] if any
one of the alternative interpretations provides both a rational basis for a verdict
acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the included
offense." State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 449, 451 (Utah 1986). The Court in State v.
Baker, 671 P.2d 152 (Utah 1983), set forth the standards to be used to determine
whether a jury should be instructed on lesser included offenses and the Appellant
submits those standards have been met stating:
If a defendant requests a lesser included instruction an evidence-based
standard controls. To determine whether an offense is included in a charged
offense, the trial court must first determine whether the offense is
established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to
establish the commission of the offense charged.
The same facts that tend to prove elements of more than one statutory
offense and lesser included offense. A review of the requested instructions will
indicate that the Defendant set forth very carefully the lessor included offenses in
the offense of Aggravated Assault, including the offense of Threatening To Use A
Firearm In A Fight Or Quarrel. All of these instructions were clearly relevant.
The evidence from the co-defendant was that no person intended to cause serious
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bodily injury and that the firearm was only exhibited at most in a fight or quarrel
or discharge only to damage property.
Especially as to Aggravated assault and simple assault using a firearm or
in a quarrel which have been statutorily graduated into different offenses
involving different levels of harm the lesser included offenses were warranted.
Here, the evidence was ambiguous and susceptible to alternative explanations and
the Defendant had produced a witness that said he was only shooting at the tires
not to cause any bodily injury to the people in the other car. The Defendant's
involvement in any shooting was only vicarious and the jury should have been
able to access the appropriate mental intent level.
The jury should also have been instructed as to the lesser included firearm
offenses. The felony offence required specific intent and the lesser included
misdemeanors did not require the specific intent and was corroborated with the
testimony of Raul Sanchez . (R. 630)
The Trial Court should have given the lesser included offense instruction as
to simple assault and all of the other lessor offenses. Alternative interpretations
provided both a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the Defendant of the offense
charged and convicting him of the included offense of simple assault and other
lesser offenses. Therefore, the Court should have given the lesser included
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instructions and the failure to do so denied the Appellant a fair trial.

CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF
In conclusion, the Court on appeal, should reverse the denial of the Motion
to Suppress. The State had the burden of showing and exception to the warrant
requirement or exigent circumstances and because no such circumstances existed
and all evidence seized should have been suppressed.
Further, the Defendant was denied a fair jury trial because the jury was not
fully instructed on the law.
DATED this

day of April, 1998.

RANDALL GAITHER
Attorney for the Defendant-Appellant

ADDENDUM
1. Information
2. Ruling of the District court from the bench. (R. 396-403)
3. Defendant's Requested Jury Instructions.

29
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I hereby certify that on the

day of April, 1998, a true and correct copy

of the foregoing BRIEF was mailed First Class, postage prepaid to:
JAN GRAHAM
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
APPELLATE DIVISION
160 EAST 300 SOUTH
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114
DATED this

day of April, 1998.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LAYTON DEPARTMENT
Bail

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
SERVANDO PARRA,
DOB: 12-19-67,
RAUL PARRA-SANCHEZ,
DOB: 12-03-60,
CARLOS PARRA,
DOB: 05-20-72, and
MIGUEL TREJO ACURIA,
DOB: 02-20-66,
Defendants

INFORMATION

T---lviMp.lL--..

The undersigned prosecutor states on information and
belief that the defendants, on or about the 19th day of January,
1997, in the County of Davis, State of Utah, committed the crimes
of:
COUNT ONE
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT (76-5-103, 76-3-203.1, 76-3-203 UCA),
a felony of the second degree, as follows:

That at the time and

place aforesaid, each defendant, as a party and in concert with two
or more persons, did commit assault as defined in Section 76-5-102
UCA and did use a dangerous weapon which is a handgun.
Under the provisions of 76-3-203.1 UCA, the defendants
are each subject to enhanced penalties for the charged offenses in
that they acted in concert with two or more persons.
Under the provisions of 76-3-203.2 UCA, the defendants

are subject to enhanced penalties for the charged offenses in that
they used a dangerous weapon or a facsimile or the representation
of a dangerous weapon in the commission or furtherance of the
felony.
COUNT TWO
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT (76-5-103, 76-3-203.1, 76-3-203 UCA) ,
a felony of the second degree, as follows:

That at the time and

place aforesaid, each defendant, as a party and in concert with two
or more persons, did commit assault as defined in Section 76-5-102
UCA and did use a dangerous weapon which is a handgun.
Under the provisions of 76-3-203.1 UCA, the defendants
are each subject to enhanced penalties for the charged offenses in
that they acted in concert with two or more persons.
Under the provisions of 76-3-203.2 UCA, the defendants
are subject to enhanced penalties for the charged offenses in that
they used a dangerous weapon or a facsimile or the representation
of a dangerous weapon in the commission or furtherance of the
felony.

COUNT THREE
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT (76-5-103, 76-3-203.1, 76-3-203 UCA) ,

a felony of the second degree, as follows:

That at the time and

place aforesaid, each defendant, as a party 'and in concert with two
or more persons, did commit assault as defined in Section 76-5-102
UCA and did use a dangerous weapon which is a handgun.
Under the provisions of 76-3-203.1 UCA, the defendants
are each subject to enhanced penalties for the charged offenses in

that they acted in concert with two or more persons.
Under the provisions of 76-3-203.2 UCA, the defendants
are subject to enhanced penalties for the charged offenses in that
they used a dangerous weapon or a facsimile or the representation
of a dangerous weapon in the commission or furtherance of the
felony.
COUNT FOUR
CARRYING

A

CONCEALED

DANGEROUS

WEAPON

USED

IN THE

COMMISSION OF A CRIME OF VIOLENCE (76-10-504(3) UCA), a felony of
the

second

degree,

as

follows: That

at

the

time

and place

aforesaid, the defendant, Servando Parra, without a valid concealed
firearm permit, did carry a concealed dangerous weapon which is a
firearm that was used in the commission of a crime of violence as
defined in 76-10-501(b).
COUNT FIVE
CRIMINAL MISCHIEF (76-6-106 UCA), a felony of the third
degree, as follows:

That at the time and place aforesaid, each

defendant as a party and in concert with two of more persons, did
intentionally damage, deface or destroy the property of another,
said conduct causing or intending to cause pecuniary loss of more
than $300 but less than $1,000.
Under the provisions of 76-3-203.2 UCA, the defendants
are subject to enhanced penalties for the charged offenses in that
they used a dangerous weapon or a facsimile or the representation
of a dangerous weapon in the commission or furtherance of the

felony.
This information is based on evidence obtained from the
following witness: Lance Remund.
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT:

The undersigned prosecutor

states that he is a Deputy Davis County Attorney and that he has
received information from the investigating officer, Lance Remund,
and the Information herein is based upon such personal observations
and investigation of said officer.
1.
to

the

On January 19, 1997, Trooper Lance Remund responded

scene

of

a possible

drive-by

shooting.

During

his

interview, Trooper Remund learned that the victims had been to a
convenience store at which time they were confronted in a hostile
manner by the defendant, Servando Parra, the co-defendant, Raul
Parra-Sanchez,

the

co-defendant,

defendant, Miguel Trejo Acuria.

Carlos

Parra,

and

the

co-

However, the victims got into a

vehicle, left the convenience store parking lot without incident,
and entered 1-15 heading North.
2.

The victims further reported to Trooper Remund that

immediately after entering 1-15, two vehicles approached them at a
high rate of speed, one of which contained the defendant as well as
each of the co-defendants.

The defendant wAs driving the vehicle.

The victims reported that the defendant and co-defendants began
flashing gang signs at them and then several shots were fired from
the vehicle occupied by the defendant and co-defendants, which
struck the vehicle occupied by the victims.

3.

The victims provided Trooper Remund with a detailed

description of both vehicles at which time an attempt to locate was
broadcast for the suspect' vehicles.
4.

Shortly

thereafter

both

vehicles

were

located

matching the description of the vehicles provided by the victims,
one of which contained the defendant and co-defendants.
5. A .357 magnum revolver, was recovered from underneath
the driver's seat.

The revolver matched the slug recovered from

the victims' vehicle.
6.

In addition, the defendant had several .357 bullets

in his coat pocket that were retrieved during a search of his
person.
7.

The damage to the victims' vehicle is estimated to

be more than $300.00 but less than $1000.00.
8.

Finally; after being taken to a vantage point where

he could observe the defendant and co-defendants, one of the
victims positively identified the defendant and co-defendants as
the individuals who he had been confronted by earlier and who were
in the vehicle that the shots were fired from.
Authorized the <x* day of Jan.,
1997, for presentment and filing:
i

MELVIN C. WILSON
Davis County Attori

Depuly Davis County Attorney

Screened by: Michael D. Di Reda
Assigned to: Michael D. Di Reda
P r e s e n t e d and f i l e d t h i s

s~J[ 'day of

<^~/f\V\ *

, 1997
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Counts One, Two, and Three of this Information each carry
a possible maximum penalty of one to fifteen years in the Utah
State Prison and/or a fine of $10,000. If the trier of fact finds
that the defendants committed the offense in concert with two of
more persons, the court shall additionally sentence the defendants
to a minimum term of six years in prison. The State is asking upon
conviction for enhancement pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 76-3-203.1.
If the trier of fact finds that the defendants committed
the offense by using a dangerous weapon or a facsimile or the
representation of a dangerous weapon in the commission or
furtherance of the felony, the court shall additionally sentence
the defendant to a minimum term of one year to run consecutively
and not concurrently; and the court may additionally sentence the
person convicted for an indeterminate term not to exceed five years
to run consecutively and not concurrently. The State is asking
upon conviction for enhancement pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 76-3203.2
Count Four of this Information carries a possible maximum
penalty of one to fifteen years imprisonment and/or up to $10,000
fine.
Count Five of this Information carries a possible maximum
penalty of zero to five years in the Utah State Prison and/or a
fine of $5,000. if the trier of fact finds that the defendants
committed the offense in concert with two of more persons, the
court shall additionally sentence the defendants to a minimum term
of three years in prison. The State is asking upon conviction for
enhancement pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 76-3-203.1.
If the trier of fact finds that the defendants committed
the offense by using a dangerous
weapon 6r a facsimile
or the
representation of a dangerous weapon in the commission or
furtherance of the; felony, the court shall additionally sentence
the defendant to $ minimum term of one year to run consecutively
and not concurrently; and the court may additionally sentence the
person convicted for an indeterminate term not to exceed five years
to run consecutively and not concurrently. The State is asking
upon conviction for enhancement pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 7 6-3203.2

RULING OF THE DISTRICT COURT
FROM THE BENCH

ITS BURDEN.
AND FINALLY WITH REGARD TO THE PRETRIAL
IDENTIFICATION.

I THINK THE TESTIMONY OF THE VICTIM HAS BEEN

MOST PROBITIVE TODAY.

HE STATED THAT HIS RECOLLECTION IS NOT

BASED ON THE FACT THEY ARE WEARING YELLOW JUMPSUITS FROM THE
JAIL, BUT BASED ON. THE ENCOUNTER THAT HE HAD WITH THEM.
IDENTIFICATION WAS PROVIDED WITHOUT HESITATION.

HIS

HE WAS FIRM

AND COMFORTABLE ON THE WITNESS STAND AND BASED ON HIS ABILITY
TO OBSERVE AS HE TESTIFIED AND THE CLOSENESS IN PROXIMITY OF
THEM THAT HE WAS TAKEN DOWN TO THE SCENE FOR THAT
IDENTIFICATION, THEN I WOULD SUBMIT TO THE COURT THAT HIS
IDENTIFICATION IS RELIABLE.
AND THAT GOES TO ONE ASPECT OF THE IDENTIFICATION
BECAUSE WE HAVE TO MEET TWO BURDENS. WE HAVE TO SHOW NOT ONLY
THAT IT WAS NOT UNDULY SUGGESTIVE BUT ALSO THAT IT WAS
RELIABLE IN AND OF ITSELF.
WITH REGARD TO THE SUGGESTIVENESS, THIS IS THE VERY
TYPE OF SHOWUP THAT THE CASE LAW TALKS ABOUT. AND
SPECIFICALLY -THE COURT:
MR. DIREDA:

I THINK THAT'S SUFFICIENT, MR. DIREDA.
STATE VERSUS MINZ, YOUR HONOR, I WOULD

DIRECT THE COURT'S ATTENTION TO THE CASE BECAUSE THAT CASE
CLEARLY SETS OUT THE STANDARD.
THE COURT:
MATTER.

THE COURT WILL RULE AS FOLLOWS IN THIS

FIRST OF ALL, I WOULD LIKE TO THANK COUNSEL FOR THE
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ASSISTANCE THAT THEY HAVE GIVEN THE COURT IN THE CASES ARE
APPLICABLE.

IT'S BEEN VERY HELPFUL AND I'VE REVIEWED IT AND

DONE SOME RESEARCH OF MY OWN.
FIRST OF ALL, ON THE STANDING ISSUE.

THE TWO ISSUES

THAT ARE RELEVANT IS THAT FIRST THE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY AND
THE SECOND IS THE; CLAIM OF EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IS
REASONABLE IN VIEW OF SOCIETY'S AS A WHOLE.
QUESTIONS THAT MUST BE ANSWERED.

THOSE ARE THE TWO

IN OF ALL THESE CASES AND

CASE LAW, BOTH STATE AND FEDERAL, IT IS CLEAR AS STATED IN THE
STATE VERSUS DAILO, I BELIEVE IT IS. A DEFENDANT WHO'S
SEARCHED WITH NEITHER A PROPRIETARY NOR POSSESSORY INTEREST IN
AN AUTOMOBILE NOR INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY SEIZED HAS NO
LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY AND NO STANDING.

AND

APPLYING THAT TO THE MATTER BEFORE THE COURT, IT IS CLEAR THAT
WITH THE EXCEPTION OF MR. SERVANDO PARRA NONE OF THESE
DEFENDANTS MEET THAT STANDING REQUIREMENT.

AND THEREFORE THEY

ARE NOT IN A POSITION TO CHALLENGE THE QUESTION OF THE
SUFFICIENCY AND ACCURACY OF THE SEARCH AND THE FRUITS WHICH
CAME FROM THAT.
THE COURT THEN TURNS TO THE BENEFIT OF MR. PARRA, TO
SERVANDO PARRA, THE QUESTION OF PROPRIETY OF THE SEARCH AND
THE MATTER BEFORE THE COURT. AN INVENTORY SEARCH IS
REASONABLE IN ORDER PROTECT THE INDIVIDUAL PROPERTY IN POLICE
CUSTODY, TO PROTECT POLICE AGAINST THE CLAIM OF LOSS OR THEFT
AND TO DETECT DANGEROUS CONDITIONS OF INSTRUMENTALITIES WITHIN
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THE IMPOUNDED VEHICLE; IN OTHER WORDS, TO PROTECT THE POLICE
FROM DANGER.
THE COURT WOULD FIND THAT THIS CASE IS NOT AN
APPROPRIATE IMPOUND CASE.
PROPERTY.

THE VEHICLE WAS ON PRIVATE

THERE WAS NO REASON TO IMPOUND THE VEHICLE UNDER

THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT EXISTED ON THAT EVENING.

FURTHER

EVIDENCE OF THAT IS THE FACT THAT THIS WAS NOT HANDLED AS A
REGULAR IMPOUND WOULD HAVE BEEN.
IMPOUND LOT.

IT WAS NOT TAKEN TO AN

IN FACT, IT WAS TAKEN TO A LOCATION WHERE IT

COULD BE SEARCHED.

AND THAT'S THE REASON IT WAS IMPOUNDED.

IT WAS NOT TO SEE ANY OF THOSE

PREREQUISITES OF AN INVENTORY

IMPOUND.
THE COURT, HOWEVER, TURNS TO THE QUESTION OF WHETHER
OR NOT THERE WAS PROBABLE CAUSE TO CONDUCT A SEARCH AND
SEIZURE OF THIS PARTICULAR VEHICLE.

IN THE MATTER BEFORE THE

COURT THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT THE OFFICERS INVOLVED HAD BEEN
INFORMED THAT THERE HAD BEEN A DRIVE-BY SHOOTING WHICH
OCCURRED IN DAVIS COUNTY.

THAT THE SUSPECTED VEHICLE WAS

IDENTIFIED AS A PONTIAC, AS I RECALL, AND TAN IN COLOR, A
LARGER GENERAL MOTORS VEHICLE.

THAT IT WAS OCCUPIED BY FOUR

OR FIVE MALES OF HISPANIC ORIGIN.

THAT THE VEHICLE WAS

THOUGHT TO BE NORTHBOUND AND THEN POSSIBLY SOUTHBOUND IN DAVIS
COUNTY.
SHORTLY AFTER THAT ATTEMPT TO LOCATE WAS ISSUED,
OFFICER HOOPER SAW THE VEHICLE OR A SIMILAR VEHICLE SOUTHBOUND
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ON 1-15 IN THE AREA OF WOODS CROS,

2600 SOUTH.

IMMEDIATELY PULLED IN BEHIND THE VEHICLE.

THAT HE

OBSERVED THE

OCCUPANTS IN THE VEHICLE. NOTED THAT THE PASSENGER IN THE
BACK SEAT KEPT TURNING AND LOOKING AT HIM AND THE VEHICLE SPED
AT SPEEDS UP TO 80 OR 90-95 MILES PER HOUR AND DURING THAT
PROCESS EXECUTED VARIOUS ERRATIC ATTEMPTS AT LEAVING THE
FREEWAY; THE MOST NOTABLE BEING THAT WHICH OCCURRED AT THE
AREA OF THE

900 WEST OFFRAMP IN SALT LAKE CITY AT WHICH TIME

THE VEHICLE SIGNALS AS IF IT WERE GOING TO STAY ON THE FREEWAY
AND GO LEFT AND THEN IMMEDIATELY VEERED TO THE RIGHT AND TOOK
THE 900 WEST EXIT.

THE OFFICER, RATHER THAN STOP THE VEHICLE

BECAUSE OF LACK OF BACKUP, CONTINUED TO FOLLOW THE VEHICLE TO
ABOUT 600 WEST IN THAT AREA OR 600 NORTH AREA WHEREIN THE
VEHICLE TURNED INTO A DRIVEWAY.
BEHIND THE VEHICLE.

HE IMMEDIATELY TURNED IN

ACTIVATED HIS OVERHEAD LIGHTS.

THE

PERSON IN THE PASSENGER SEAT OF THE VEHICLE RAN INTO THE HOME
DESPITE HIS REQUEST THAT HE NOT DO SO.

MR. SERVANDO PARRA,

WHO WAS THE DRIVER, TRIED TO EXIT THE VEHICLE BUT WAS ASKED BY
THE OFFICER TO REMAIN AND HE DID.
THE COURT WOULD FIND THAT BASED UPON THAT INFORMATION
THE OFFICER IN QUESTION HAD PROBABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE THAT THE
CRIME HAD BEEN COMMITTED AND THAT THESE DEFENDANTS HAD
COMMITTED THAT CRIME AND THAT THE CRIME WAS A FELONY AND THERE
WAS PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST AT THAT TIME.

THE COURT WOULD

FIND THAT SHORTLY AFTER THAT BACKUP ARRIVED.

EACH OF THE
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OCCUPANTS OF THE VEHICLE WERE ASKED TO LEAVE THE VEHICLE OR
SUMMARILY PATTED DOWN AND HANDCUFFED AND THEN WERE, PURSUANT
TO THAT, PATTED DOWN IN A MORE EXTENSIVE MANNER AND INCIDENT
TO THE ARREST THEREIN THE 357 CARTRIDGES WERE FOUND IN THE
POCKET OF MR. PARRA.
THE COURT WOULD FIND THAT THERE WAS PROBABLE CAUSE AS
I'VE INDICATED TO ARREST ALL OF THE OCCUPANTS OF THAT VEHICLE,
GIVEN THE INFORMATION KNOWN TO THE OFFICER.

THE COURT WOULD

FIND THAT THE OFFICERS WERE AWARE THAT THIS WAS THE VEHICLE
THAT HAD BEEN IDENTIFIED.

THAT THE VICTIMS WERE BROUGHT BY

AND MR. TOKELAU LEALIKI WAS BROUGHT BY THE VEHICLE AND SHORTLY
AFTER THE INCIDENT OCCURRED AND WITH HIS OWN INITIATIVE PICKED
OUT THE VEHICLE, ALTHOUGH IT WAS DIFFERENT IN COLOR THAN THAT
INITIALLY BROADCAST AS BEING THE VEHICLE THAT WAS INVOLVED.
THE OFFICERS NOTICED IN PLAIN VIEW IN THE VEHICLE CERTAIN
CARTRIDGES THAT WERE IN THE CONSOLE AND A SCANNER.
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AND THE

COURT WOULD FIND THAT THEY HAD -- THAT THE POLICE HAD PROBABLE
CAUSE TO SEARCH THE VEHICLE.
THE COURT WOULD FIND THAT NOT ONLY THE CONTENTS OF
THE VEHICLE BUT THE VEHICLE ITSELF CONSTITUTED EVIDENCE AND
THAT THEY HAD THE RIGHT TO SEIZE THAT EVIDENCE AT THAT TIME
AND THAT'S WHAT THEY DID.

THE COURT WOULD FIND THAT THE

VEHICLE WAS SEIZED AND WAS SUBSEQUENTLY TAKEN TO THE
FARMINGTON CITY SHOPS WHERE A SEARCH WAS CONDUCTED.
THE LAW IS CLEAR THAT THE CRITICAL QUESTION AS TO
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SEARCHES OF THIS NATURE IS THAT THE PROBABLE CAUSE ISSUE IS
CRITICAL AT THE TIME THAT THE INCIDENT OCCURRED.

IN THE MOST

RECENT PRONOUNCEMENT BY THE SUPREME COURT WHICH IS STATE
VERSUS ANDERSON WHICH WAS AUTHORED BY, AS I RECALL -- WELL,
DOESN'T MATTER.

BUT THEY STATE IN THAT OPINION THAT AS LONG

AS THE POLICE HAVE PROBABLE CAUSE TO SEARCH AND EXIGENT
CIRCUMSTANCES EXIST AT THE TIME THE AUTOMOBILE WAS STOPPED AND
SEIZED, A WARRANTLESS SEARCH CONDUCTED SOMETIME LATER AT A
SECURE LOCATION WOULD NOT OFFEND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT.

AND

THAT WAS JUSTICE RUSSON THAT ISSUED THAT OPINION.
THE COURT WOULD FIND THAT THERE WERE EXIGENT
CIRCUMSTANCES SIMILAR TO THOSE WHICH HAVE BEEN PREVELANT IN
CHAMBERS AND THOSE CASES

AND THAT THE SEARCH EXECUTED BY THE

POLICE IN THIS CASE WAS IN FACT WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF THE
STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTION.

AND THEREFORE THE COURT WILL

DENY THE DEFENDANT'S SERVANDO PARRA'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE
WEAPON THAT WAS FOUND IN THE VEHICLE.
THE COURT NEXT TURNS TO THE QUESTION OF SHOWUP AND
THE IDENTIFICATION THAT WAS OBTAINED AT THAT PARTICULAR
LOCATION.

THE CRITICAL ISSUE IS DID THAT IDENTIFICATION AT

THE POINT OF ARREST VIOLATE THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF EITHER
THE STATE OR FEDERAL CONSTITUTION.
IN LOOKING AT REALLY TWO ISSUES THERE. WAS THE SHOWUP
SO SUGGESTIVE AS TO GIVE RISE TO PROBABILITY OF IRREPERABLE
IDENTIFICATION.

AND SECONDLY UNDER THE TOTALITY OF THE
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CIRCUMSTANCES WAS THE IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURE RELIABLE. THE
COURT WOULD FIND THAT ESSENTIALLY THE STANDARD IS THE SAME FOR
BOTH STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTION.

JUSTICE ZIMMERMAN,

LOOKING AT THAT QUESTION, SEEMS TO BE THE ROMERAS CASE JUST
ABOUT FOLLOWING VERBATIM THE DISTINCTION IN THE LONG CASE
WHICH HAD TO DO WITH EYE WITNESS IDENTIFICATION AND THE
QUESTION OF RELIABILITY.

LOOKING AT THE OPPORTUNITY THE

WITNESSES HAD TO VIEW THE ACTOR AT THE TIME OF THE EVENT. MR.
LEALIKI TESTIFIED THEY WERE HANGING OUT OF THE WINDOW.

THAT

THE VEHICLES WERE IN THREE OR FOUR FEET OF EACH OTHER
TRAVELLING UP THE FREEWAY AND THAT EXTENDED FOR SEVERAL
SECONDS.

THAT HE HAD A GOOD LOOK AT THE OCCUPANTS OF THE

VEHICLE.

HE INDICATED HE COULD NOT SEE THE DRIVER.

BUT THAT

HE CLEARLY SAW THE TYPE OF CLOTHING THAT HE WAS WEARING.

AND

FROM HIS TESTIMONY THE COURT ASSUMES HE WAS WEARING ONE OF THE
DUSTER KIND OF WESTERN CLOTHING THAT SOME OF OUR YOUTH AND
OTHERS SEEM TO WEAR FROM TIME TO TIME.
THE COURT WOULD FIND THAT THE INCIDENT WAS ONE IN
WHICH THE ATTENTION OF MR. LEALIKI WOULD HAVE BEEN DRAWN TO
THE ACTOR.

THIS WAS A SITUATION IN WHICH THEY WERE SHOUTING

BACK AND FORTH AND BASICALLY THE LEALIKI VEHICLE WAS
SURROUNDED BY TWO VEHICLES WITHIN A FEW FEET OF EACH OTHER
TRAVELLING UP THE FREEWAY IN CLOSE PROXIMITY.

THE COURT WOULD

FIND THAT THE DESCRIPTION THAT WAS GIVEN OF THE OCCUPANTS WERE
THAT OF HISPANIC MALES.

I REALIZE THAT IS NOT DEFINITIVE BUT
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THE VEHICLE WAS DESCRIBED AS A BUICK -- EXCUSE ME -- IT WAS A
BUICK RATHER THAN A PONTIAC AS I PREVIOUSLY STATED.
LEAST THE A.T.L. SAID IT WAS TAN IN COLOR.

THAT AT

MR. LEALIKI SAID

IN FACT IT WAS BLUE IN COLOR AND IN FACT THE EVIDENCE WOULD
SHOW IT WAS.
THE COURT WOULD FIND THAT MR. LEALIKI WAS CERTAIN IN
HIS IDENTIFICATION OF THE WITNESSES AT THE TIME OF THE
CONFRONTATION AND THAT HIS BEING TAKEN TO THE AREA AND VIEW
THE DEFENDANT WAS WITHIN A FEW HOURS

OF THE INCIDENT THE SAME

NIGHT.
THE COURT WOULD FIND THAT THE SITUATION WHICH THE
VICTIM SAW WHEN HE ARRIVED AT THE SCENE HE PICKED OUT THE
VEHICLE WITHOUT ANY SUGGESTION.

THE COURT WOULD FIND HE

OBSERVED THE DEFENDANT WHO WAS IN HANDCUFFS IN THE LIGHTS OF A
POLICE VEHICLE AND HE IDENTIFIED THEM AS BEING THE OCCUPANTS
OF THE VEHICLE IN QUESTION.

THE COURT WOULD FIND THAT UNDER

THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES, THAT THE IDENTIFICATION PROCESS WAS
RELIABLE.

WAS NOT SO SUGGESTIVE

AS TO GIVE RISE TO THE

PROBABILITY OF IRREPARABLE IDENTIFICATION.

THE COURT MAKES

THAT DECISION IN LIGHT OF ONE OF THE CASES CITED BY COUNSEL OR
ONE I READ MYSELF. I CAN'T REMEMBER.

BUT IN THIS CASE THE

DEFENDANT WAS HANDCUFFED TO A FENCE AND THE VICTIM WAS BROUGHT
TO THE LOCATION AND THE DEFENDANT WAS SPOTLIGHTED, HANDCUFFED
TO THE FENCE AND THE EYE WITNESS IDENTIFICATION WAS MADE AND
THE COURT RULED THAT WAS NOT UNDULY SUGGESTIVE.
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DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTIONS

INSTRUCTION
You are instructed that under Utah Law, the offense of Assault is:
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to another;
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to do bodily injury
to another; or
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes or creates a substantial
risk of bodily injury to another.
Simple Assault is a class B misdemeanor and a lesser included offense to
aggravated assault.
Assault is a class A misdemeanor if the person causes substantial bodily injury to
another.
A person commits aggravated assault a third degree felony if he commits assault
and in addition he:
attempts, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to another, and he
uses a dangerous weapon or other means or force likely to produce death or serious
bodily injury.

-3-

INSTRUCTION
Under Utah Law, a person may not carry a loaded firearm:
(a) in or on a vehicle;
(b) on any public street; or
(c) in a posted prohibited area.
A violation of Carrying a Loaded Firearm is a class B misdemeanor. If the concealed
firearm is used in the commission of a crime of violence and the person is a party to the
offense, the person is guilty of a second degree felony.
"Crime of violence" means in relation to the charges in this case the offense of
assault with a dangerous weapon, assault with intent to commit any offense punishable
by imprisonment for more than one year, or an attempt to commit any of these offenses.
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INSTRUCTION

Under Utah law, a person who, not in necessary self defense in the presence of
two or more persons, draws or exhibits any dangerous weapon in an angry and
threatening manner or unlawfully uses the same in any fight or quarrel is guilty of a class
A misdemeanor.
The offense of Threatening with or using dangerous weapon in fight or quarrel is
a lesser included offense of Aggravated Assault. If you find the Defendant not guilty of
Aggravated Assault, you must consider the offense of Threatening with or using
dangerous weapon in fight or quarrel.
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INSTRUCTION
Before you could convict the Defendant, Servando Parra, of the crime of
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT as charged in Count I of the Information, you must from
the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the following elements of the crime:
1. That on or about January 19, 1997, in Davis County, State of Utah;
2. the Defendant, individually or as a party in concert with another person,
assaulted another person;
3. the Defendant acted intentionally, knowingly or recklessly in committing the
assault; and
4. the Defendant, individually or as a party in concert with another person, used a
dangerous weapon or force likely to produce death or bodily injury to commit the assault.
If after consideration of all of the evidence in this case, you are convinced of the
truth of each and every one of the forgoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then
you must find the Defendant, Servando Parra, guilty of AGGRAVATED ASSAULT as
charged in Count I of the Information. If on the other hand after careful consideration of
all of the evidence in the case you are not convinced of each and every element of the
offense, then you must consider the lesser included offense of THREATENING WITH
OR USING A DANGEROUS WEAPON.
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INSTRUCTION
Before you could convict the Defendant, Servando Parra, of the crime of SIMPLE
ASSAULT as charged in Count I of the Information, you must from the evidence,
beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the following elements of the crime:
1. That on or about January 19, 1997, in Davis County, State of Utah;
2. the Defendant, individually or as a party in concert with another person,
assaulted another person; and
3. the Defendant acted intentionally, knowingly or recklessly in committing the
assault.
If after consideration of all of the evidence in this case, you are convinced of the
truth of each and every one of the forgoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then
you must find the Defendant, Servando Parra, guilty of SIMPLE ASSAULT as charged
in Count I of the Information. If on the other hand after careful consideration of all of
the evidence in the case you are not convinced of each and every element of the offense,
then you must find the Defendant not Guilty.
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INSTRUCTION
Before you can convict the Defendant, Servando Parra, of the crime of
CARRYING A CONCEALED DANGEROUS WEAPON USED IN THE
COMMISSION OF A CRIME OF VIOLENCE as charged in Count IV of the
Information, you must find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt all of the
following elements of the crime:
1. That on or about January 19, 1997, in Davis County, State of Utah;
2. the Defendant knowingly or intentionally concealed a dangerous weapon;
3. the Defendant knew the firearm had been used in a crime of violence, and
4. Servando Parra was a party in the crime of violence in which the firearm had
been used prior to concealing the firearm.
If after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this case you are convinced
of the truth of each and every one of the forgoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt,
then you must find the Defendant, Servando Parra, guilty of CARRYING A
CONCEALED DANGEROUS WEAPON USED IN THE COMMISSION OF A
CRIME OF VIOLENCE. On the other hand, after careful consideration of all of the
evidence in this case, you are not convinced of each of the elements, then you must then
consider the lesser included offense of CARRYING A LOADED FIREARM IN A
VEHICLE.
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INSTRUCTION
Before you can convict the Defendant, Servando Parra, of the crime of
CARRYING A LOADED FIREARM IN A VEHICLE a lesser included offense charged
in Count IV of the Information, you must find from the evidence beyond a reasonable
doubt all of the following elements of the crime:
1. That on or about January 19, 1997, in Davis County, State of Utah; and
2. the Defendant knowingly or intentionally carried a loaded firearm in a vehicle.
If after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this case you are convinced
of the truth of each and every one of the forgoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt,
then you must find the Defendant, Servando Parra, guilty of carrying a concealed
weapon. On the other hand, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this case,
you are not convinced of each of the elements, then you must find the Defendant not
guilty.
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